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Industrialization and Ethnic Change in the Modern World 
 
Elliott Green1 
Department of International Development, London School of Economics, London, UK 
 
Abstract: 
Despite the large recent attention given to ethnicity within the social sciences, the sources of 
modern ethnic change have remained opaque.  Drawing upon social theory from Marx and Gellner, 
I argue here that industrialization incentivizes ethnic homogenization by lowering the relative value 
of land.  Using carbon emissions per capita as a proxy for industrialization, I show that cross-
country changes in ethno-linguistic fractionalization between 1961 and 1985 are negatively 
correlated with industrialization, and that this result is robust to the use of a variety of control 
variables, sub-samples and alternative measures of industrialization such as cement production, 
urbanization and agriculture as a percentage of GDP.  In particular I find no evidence for the direct 
role of the state in promoting ethnic homogenization, which adds to other recent evidence on how 
economic incentives may trump political ones as regards identity change, at least in the short- to 
medium term. 
 
Keywords: ethnic change; industrialization; ELF; structural transformation; urbanization; ethnic 
identity 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The literature on ethnicity has burgeoned across the social sciences in recent decades, with 
an increasing degree of sophistication.  Scholars from political science, sociology, and economics 
have all contributed to our collective understanding of ethnicity within recent years, including 
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notable research into how and why ethnic diversity undermines cooperation (Habyarimana et al. 
2009), the interaction between ethnic identity and party politics (Posner 2005), and how ethnicity 
affects conflict (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Esteban and Ray 2008; Wimmer et al. 2009), among 
other topics.  There has also been an attempt to explain variation in ethnic diversity across the 
world, with suggestion that ethnic diversity can be explained as a result of state history, genetic 
diversity, land diversity, modern state strength and colonial rule (Ahlerup and Olsson 2012; Ashraf 
and Galor 2013; Bleaney and Dimico 2016; Michalopoulos 2012; Wimmer 2015). 
Yet despite the advancements of this literature one topic still remains somewhat opaque, 
namely why ethnic identity changes across time.  Despite a general agreement that people can hold 
multiple ethnic identities and that the salience of these identities is not fixed, there has nonetheless 
been very few attempts to systematically examine the dynamics of ethnic fractionalization, 
especially in a cross-national context.  As such I show here that industrialization promotes ethnic 
homogenization.  More specifically, I draw upon a long tradition of social theory from Marx and 
Gellner, among others, to argue that industrialization creates incentives for people to re-identify as 
part of larger ethnic groups in a bottom-up manner.  In particular I suggest that industrialization 
lowers the relative value of land, thereby disincentiving the use of more narrow rural ethnic 
identities.  I also test for the possibility that ethnic homogenization is driven in a top-down manner 
by state policies through such proxies such as schooling and the provision of public goods, and fail 
to find evidence that states are directly responsible for ethnic change. 
To test this theory I use cross-national Soviet data on changes in ethnic diversity over time 
in a long difference model to show that industrialization, as proxied by change in log of carbon 
emissions per capita, is negatively correlated with change in ethnic diversity, a result which is 
robust to various control variables and sub-samples.  I show that ethnic homogenization is being 
driven by increasing percentages of people who identify with the largest ethnic group in each 
country, and that the results do not change when I use alternative measures of industrialization such 
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as changes in cement production per capita, urbanization and the percentage of GDP derived from 
agriculture. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Next in section 2 I discuss the use of ethnicity as both an 
exogenous and endogenous variable, with attention to social theorists like Marx and Engels, Gellner 
and others who have argued for a causal effect of industrialization on ethnic homogenization.  
Section 3 presents my cross-national quantitative analysis, including the use of controls and sub-
samples, while section 4 examines change in the percentage identifying with the largest ethnic 
group and alternative measures of industrialization.  In section 5 I conclude. 
 
2. Understanding Ethnicity and Ethnic Change 
 
Ethnicity is a highly contested term within the social sciences (Brubaker 2004).  I do not 
wish to delve into debates on the meaning of ethnicity except to note that I define ethnicity here 
along the lines suggested by many authors (Bentley 1987; Chandra 2006; Cohen 1978; Fearon 
2003), namely that ethnic groups are social groups based on the idea that members share some form 
of common descent.  The question about whether or not members of a given group actually do share 
common ancestors is largely irrelevant; what instead matters is that a belief in common descent is 
prevalent enough that it binds people together in a single community. 
It is now widely acknowledged that individuals can have a multitude of nested ethnic 
identities, many of which can be considered as based on a belief in common descent and thus ethnic 
in nature (Bentley 1987, 35; Cohen 1978, 387).  In Uganda and many other parts of Africa, for 
instance, one can simultaneously be a member of a sub-clan (for instance, the Busito sub-clan 
within the Nte clan of Buganda), a clan (Nte), a tribe (Buganda), a super-tribe, linguistic or regional 
group (Bantu-speakers or Southerners, groups which largely overlap) and a race (African).  One 
way to conceptualize these different identities is as differently-sized Russian (Matryoshka) dolls or 
a series of concentric circles, with individuals simultaneously possessing multiple identities based 
4 
 
on different sized groups.  A process of ethnic homogenization would thus consist of shifting one’s 
primary identity from a smaller doll or circle to a larger one, thereby emphasizing an identity which 
is shared by more people than the previous smaller identity.  The way this identify shift could be 
captured would be to examine change across time in a given population’s measure of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (ELF).  Each country’s ELF score is calculated using the Herfindahl 
concentration formula, namely by summing the squares of the percentages of all ethnic groups 
larger than one per cent of the population and subtracting this sum from one.  Thus a decreasing 
ELF score would indicate a process of homogenization, while a rising ELF score would indicate 
increasing levels of diversity. 
If individuals have multiple ethnic identities to choose from, one can hypothesize that they 
will choose to prioritize the ethnic identity that gives them the greatest net benefit.  This is not a 
particularly radical assumption, inasmuch as it is the basis for the current scholarship on identity 
formation in the social sciences labeled as “instrumentalist.”  Here ethnicity is an instrument, or a 
means to an end, rather than an end in itself, in contrast to the “primordialist” school where 
identities are taken as a given. 
The question is thus what major social, economic or political forces create incentives for 
people to alter their ethnic identity en masse.  At the macro level most attention has centered on the 
role of the state in promoting ethnic/national homogenization (Malesevic 2013; Mann 2013; Weber 
1976), and thus at the micro-case study level much of the literature has focused on political 
motivations for choosing ethnic identities in such examples as the former Soviet Union (Laitin 
1998), post-colonial Zambia (Posner 2005) and colonial India (Cassan 2015).  However, in none of 
these cases was the focus on explicitly testing competing explanations for what causes ethnic 
change per se, nor was there an attempt to generalize the findings by using cross-national data. 
I posit here that the most profound force for promoting ethnic homogenization in the modern 
world is industrialization, inasmuch as industrialization leads to a decline in the relative value of 
land.  (Here I define industrialization as the shift away from an economy based on agrarian 
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production.)  Thus, as people leave the agrarian sector and enter the industrial sector they lose their 
attachment to smaller rural ethnic identities which formerly gave them access to land, and instead 
emphasize the salience of larger group identities which are more useful for gaining access to 
employment in the modern industrial sector. 
To understand the effect of industrialization on ethnic identity it is necessary first to 
examine the nature of ethnic identity in a broad historical context.  Recently many economists, 
ecologists and anthropologists have suggested that ethnic diversity across the world is correlated 
with a number of ecological factors like latitude (negatively), elevation (positively) and differential 
land endowments (positively) (Ahlerup and Olsson 2012; Michalopoulous 2012; Wimmer 2015).  
There are two possible interrelated reasons for these relationships.  First, warm tropical 
environments with predictable climates (as regards the variability of temperature and rainfall) are 
ideal for becoming self-sufficient in food and thereby create few incentives for inhabitants to 
migrate or form social ties with people across a large amount of territory.  The same logic applies to 
differential land endowments, which lead human groups to become specialized in growing certain 
types of crops and thus discourage migration to other areas that are not suitable for the same crops 
(Michalopoulous 2012).  Second, even if humans wanted to migrate, mountains, different disease 
environments and dense tropical rainforests can create physical barriers and disincentives to 
movement and thereby promote cultural isolation. 
Thus in the pre-modern or pre-industrial world isolation encouraged greater ethnic diversity.  
In such isolated societies it would have made no sense to identify with a foreign ethnic group 
inasmuch as livelihoods and income within the group depended on other members of that group and 
access to that group’s land and ecological skill set.  In contrast, however, the incentives for ethnic 
identification change with industrialization as people leave the rural agrarian economy to move to 
the industrial urban sector, where access to rural land, ethnic-specific agricultural skills and support 
from one’s rural community are all relatively unimportant in making a living.  Instead, what is 
valuable to the new industrial working class is their ability to earn an income through their labor, 
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which can be enhanced by shedding their previous narrow rural identity in favor of a larger identity 
shared by more people.  In other words, as both people and profits move from rural to urban areas, 
access to labor become more important than land in the acquisition of income and wealth. 
Theoretically the first and most forceful such statement identifying the homogenizing 
incentives of industrialization comes from Marx and Engels in their early writings.  They clearly 
state that, in the premodern rural world individuals are “united by some bond: family, tribe, the land 
itself, etc.” and the economy is guided by an exchange between people and the natural environment 
(Marx and Engels 1978 [1848], 468-469).  The ownership of land is the basis for the economy and 
thus people remain attached to the land.  Individual peasants may be said to be members of an 
ethnic group, class or nation, but without any "community [or] national bond" they are merely like a 
"sack of potatoes" in Marx’s memorable phrase. 
However, modern industrialization sees a huge shift in the basis of production as the basis 
for the economy and economic growth shifts from land to labor.   Here members from previously 
isolated and separate rural communities come together to work, thereby making manifest for the 
first time the division between the “two great classes” of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.  Thus 
while in the rural sector laborers held location- or ethnic-specific capital, in the industrial sector 
they lose their distinctiveness and become part of a “floating” army of workers, whereby their 
exploitation at the hands of the bourgeoisie creates the impetus for class consciousness and 
subsequent revolution. 
In other word, while not claiming explicitly that industrialization promotes ethnic 
homogenization, Marx and Engels were nonetheless clear about the way in which industrialization 
created incentives for social homogenization, in two ways.  First, the bourgeoisie needed to create a 
homogenous workforce that it can employ in its factories and shops, a process which I henceforth 
label the "top-down" mechanism inasmuch as the process of ethnic homogenization is largely a 
result of the efforts of the ruling elite.  However, Marx is explicit that the process of class formation 
is a byproduct of modern capitalism rather than a deliberate outcome directed by the bourgeoisie, 
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which has no incentive to create a large united class opposed to its interests.  Instead, there is a 
second process of homogenization at work whereby members of the proletariat have strong 
incentives to cooperate through unions and political parties in order to fight the exploitation of the 
bourgeoisie.  Indeed, Marx and Engels’ famous call at the end of the Manifesto for workers of the 
world to unite is essentially based on their belief that, despite their varied backgrounds and 
cultural/ethnic differences, the advent of the modern industrial economy means that workers’ 
interests now lie together with each other.  This second process I label the "bottom-up" mechanism, 
since here homogenization is the result of the actions of the non-elite based on what they perceive 
to be their best interests. 
The influence of Marx and Engels on Ernest Gellner’s theory of nationalism, where 
industrialization is instead made explicitly responsible for the rise of modern national identities, is 
quite clear (despite the fact that Gellner did not consider himself a Marxist).  Like Marx and Engels, 
Gellner also draws a sharp divide between the pre-modern rural world and the modern industrial 
world, whereby the former consists of “small peasant communities” leading “inward-turned lives, 
tied to the locality by economic need” (Gellner 2006 [1983], 10).  Far from there being incentives to 
homogenize or assimilate, “no one, or almost no one, has an interest in promoting cultural 
homogeneity at this social level” (Gellner 2006 [1983], 11). 
However, just as with Marx and Engels, Gellner posits that industrialization requires an 
educated and culturally homogenous workforce and thus employers encourage cultural assimilation 
of rural-urban migrants into the dominant ethnic group of the newly industrialized areas.  Those 
who assimilate into this dominant group – known as the “Megalomanians” in Gellner’s famous 
story – do so in order to obtain jobs in the modern economy.  As with Marx, Gellner implicitly 
provides both "top-down" and "bottom-up" mechanisms by which industrialization promotes ethnic 
homogenization.  On the one hand the Megalomanian state elite promote a common Megalomanian 
identity in a conscious "top-down" manner, in particular via mass education in the former high 
culture of the Megalomanian elite.  However, there are also strong incentives for various ethnic 
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minorities to assimilate as Megalomanian in order to share in the state’s “growing prosperity” 
(Gellner 2006 [1983], 59), with or without state pressure.  Thus one of my main goals below will be 
not only to test the role of industrialization in promoting ethnic homogenization, but to examine 
which of the two of these mechanisms finds more support with the data. 
 Before we continue, it is important to note two additional features of the Marxian/Gellnerian 
framework.  First, for both Marx and Gellner industrialization generates incentives for most people 
not just to identify with a larger ethnic group but specifically with the largest group in society, 
namely the proletariat and the Megalomanians, respectively.  Second, in both cases the process of 
homogenization is temporary, inasmuch as it takes place while countries transition to a capitalist, 
industrialized economy.  Thus for Marx the development of class consciousness is one stage in 
history rather than an ongoing process.  For Gellner it is the transition from agrarian society to 
industrial society which gives rise to nationalism, especially via uneven industrialization.  In neither 
case should we expect homogenization to continue or decline once industrialization is complete, at 
least after controlling for migration.  Both of these features then present themselves as additional 
theories to be tested below. 
 
3. Cross-National Quantitative Evidence 
 
If industrialization leads to ethnic homogenization, then cross-national data on ethnic 
diversity should exhibit this relationship.  As such I could potentially regress a measure of ethnic 
diversity on measures of industrialization in a cross-sectional database in order to see if there was a 
correlation between lower levels of diversity and higher levels of industrialization.  Such an 
exercise would also allow me to test the primordial assumption that ethnicity will only change due 
to the entry and exit of people from the population group in question, namely via international 
migration, which I measure here as the ratio of immigrants to the total population of a country.  
(Inasmuch as variance decreases with population size the migration data suffers from 
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heteroscedasticity, leading me to employ robust standard errors.)  Of course, a cross-sectional 
correlation cannot help identify causality; as such I instead use a long-difference regression, where I 
regress change over two points in time in levels of ethnic diversity on change in industrialization in 
a cross-sectional dataset. 
For the dependent variable I turn to country-level ELF scores for 1961 and 1985 as listed in 
two Soviet ethnographic atlases authored or co-authored by the ethnographer Solomon Bruk, which 
were themselves based on individual country censuses, UN data, Soviet ethnographic journals and 
other data (Bruk and Apanchenko 1964; Bruk 1986).  The data from the Atlas Narodov Mira 
(henceforth ANM) lists in each case the total population of each country before listing individual 
ethnic groups and their sizes, often in a large amount of detail.  For instance, the 1985 dataset lists 
148 ethnic groups for Indonesia ranging in population from 74 million Javanese and 20.5 million 
Sundanese to 4000 Manusela, and 3000 Ambelau, among others.  In other cases the Atlas lists the 
population of very small ethnic groups, such as the Alacalufe of Argentina and Chile, whose 
populations in 1985 were estimated at 100 and 200 people, respectively.  In a small number of very 
homogenous countries such as Haiti, Japan and Poland, the ANM only lists one ethnic group per 
country, with the rest of the population listed as “other;” I address this issue in more detail below. 
The ANM dataset – which was originally collated by Roeder (2001) but which I 
independently collected from the original sources – is ideal for several reasons.  First, it is the only 
extant dataset that measures changes in ethnicity over time across the whole world, with specific 
attention to providing up-to-date population data in both atlases.  Indeed, a close comparison of the 
1985 ANM data with data on ethnic identity from demographic and health surveys from the late 
1980s suggests that it adequately captures the definition of ethnicity discussed above, as discussed 
in Appendix 5.  Second, it covers a large enough amount of time to uncover substantial amounts of 
ethnic change.  Third and finally, the ANM dataset covers a large number of countries.1 
The ANM dataset is, however, potentially problematic: as it largely relies upon census data, 
it is possible that it is not really capturing ethnic identity but identities imposed or at least 
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circumscribed by state officials (Anderson 1991).  While this would be a serious problem if one was 
only examining a cross-sectional relationship, the use of long-difference regressions mean that such 
census inaccuracies would cancel out as long as they are consistent across the two Atlases.  In order 
to see whether these inaccuracies were consistent or not, I examined whether all groups listed for 
one country in one Atlas are listed in the other; for cases where the listings are not consistent I 
either corrected the data or deleted the countries from the analysis, as detailed in Appendix 6.  
Another way to limit this problem is to examine subsets of countries which exclude potentially 
problematic cases as identified in the literature, which I employ below.  One such group would be 
former British colonies, which arguably have a legacy of greater fractionalization than other former 
colonies due to a colonial interest in preventing ethnic homogenization (Robinson 2014); another 
includes African and European countries, which have lower rates of ethnic enumeration on censuses 
than other parts of the world (Morning 2008). 
As regards measuring change in industrialization, unfortunately there are very few country-
year observations for such variables as industry or agriculture as a percentage of GDP that date back 
to the early 1960s.2  Instead I use log of carbon emissions in metric tons per capita, or CO2 
emissions, as a proxy for industrialization, as it is available for 133 countries going back to 1961.  
Carbon emissions are a good measure of industrialization for three reasons.  First, thanks to efforts 
of researchers at the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center in the US, there is high quality 
annual data on carbon emissions by country dating back to 1960, which derives from various UN 
country questionnaires and national statistical publications.  The quality of data on carbon emissions 
is thus in sharp contrast to other potential measures of industrialization, as discussed more below.  
Second, carbon emissions are a good proxy for industrialization inasmuch as they are the result of 
modern industrial economies, mainly via fossil fuel consumption (for such purposes as electricity, 
heating and transportation), as well as cement production.  Third, carbon emissions correspond to 
the non-linear, inverted-U relationship between economic development and industrialization, 
inasmuch as the rate of increase in carbon emissions peaks as countries industrialize and then 
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declines as they become post-industrial and more efficient at carbon production.  Thus for most 
developed areas of the world the curve representing absolute levels of carbon emissions per capita 
plotted against time exhibits a sideways S-shape, such that the curve is relatively flat both today and 
farther back in the past but has a high positive slope as countries industrialize.  This non-linear 
relationship also captures the essence of industrialization as a transition period, as discussed in the 
theoretical section above.  However, as there might be concerns as to what degree carbon emissions 
are a good proxy for industrialization, I use three alternative measures of industrialization in my 
robustness tests below. 
More formally, the cross-sectional regressions for both 1961 and 1985 can be expressed as 
 
ELF1961i = α1961 + β1C1961i + β2M1961i + γXi + ε1961i (1) 
ELF1985i = α1985 + β’1C1985i + β’2M1985i + γXi + ε1985i (2) 
 
with ELF1961i and ELF1985i as measures of ELF in 1961 and 1985 for country i, C1961i and C1985i as 
levels of carbon emissions per capita in 1960 and 1985 for country i, M1961i and M1985i as the 
percentage of migrants in 1960 and 1985 for country i, and γXi as a vector of time-invariant 
controls, including many variables identified above as correlated with levels of ethnic diversity such 
as mean absolute latitude, mean elevation, mean temperature, and differential land endowments, 
among others.  Subtracting equation 1 from equation 2 therefore eliminates these controls and 
yields the following basic long-difference model: 
 
ΔELFi = ζ + γ1ΔCi + γ2ΔMi + Δεi (3) 
 
where for country i ΔELFi is change in ELF between 1961 and 1985, ΔCi is change in carbon 
emissions per capita and ΔMi is change in the percentage of migrants. 
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Of course, when using a relatively small sample of observations it is important to check for 
outliers which may be driving any results.  Therefore I used the DFbeta outlier detector tool on 
regression 3, which yielded three clear outliers, namely Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates.3  In all three cases local labor shortages led governments to recruit large numbers of 
workers from other parts of the Middle East and South Asia to work in their oil fields, which saw 
immigrants becoming the majority of the population between 1960 and 1975.  Moreover, 
population data in these countries is notoriously questionable, as noted in an earlier attempt to 
collect cross-national ELF data by Fearon (2003, 219).  As a result I exclude all three countries 
from my analysis here.  For a graph of the relationship between change in ELF (on the y-axis) and 
change in carbon emissions (on the x-axis) between 1961 and 1985 with 95% confidence intervals 
see Figure 1, and for descriptive statistics and more complete definitions of the variables see 
Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.4 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
My initial set of results is presented in Table 1.  In column 1 I regress change in ELF on 
change in carbon emissions while controlling for change in international migration.  In column 2 I 
control for initial levels of both ELF and carbon emissions to account for the possibility that the 
relationship between change in ELF and carbon emissions is spurious due to the effects of initial 
levels on subsequent change for both variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In columns 3-8 I add six additional variables in six separate specifications due to missing 
data and potential problems of multicollinearity that result from including too many explanatory 
variables in one specification.5  In column 3 I control for change in the log of GDP per capita from 
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1961 to 1985, inasmuch as it is possible that it is not actually industrialization that is driving ethnic 
homogenization but instead an increase in wealth, which may come from sources other than 
industrial production.  In column 4 I use the Polity IV database to control for change in democracy 
over the period, inasmuch as it is plausible that, as countries democratize, ethnic minorities will 
suffer less discrimination and ethnic conflict will decline (Wimmer 2015, 35). 
I next test the argument from both Marx and Gellner, as well as more recently from 
Malesevic (2013), Mann (2013), Weber (1976) and Wimmer (2015), that ethnic homogenization is 
driven by the ruling elite via state policies.  There are two ways to operationalize the effects of 
states on ethnic identity change.  The first draws explicitly on Gellner's emphasis on schooling as a 
means to homogenize populations.  In particular it is possible that decreases in ELF are a 
consequence of increased fluency in state languages and/or education policies promoting 
assimilation among ethnic minorities.  Thus in column 5 I control for change in the mean number of 
years of primary and secondary school attended, which is calculated for the majority of countries in 
my sample. 
Another way to operationalize the effect of state policies on ethnic identity is to consider the 
role of state capacity, whereby stronger states are able to enforce or incentivize ethnic 
homogenization while weaker states are unable to do so (Wimmer 2015).  In particular this 
emphasis not just on the existence of a modern state but the potential variation in its power over its 
citizens is most obvious in Anderson (1991)'s description of "official nationalism."  The classic 
measure of state capacity is taxation, inasmuch as tax collection involves an efficient bureaucracy 
that is able to extract taxes from a large number of citizens.  Thus in column 6 I control for change 
in government revenue as a percentage of GDP (with similar results if I instead compute change in 
government expenditure per capita.) 
Another measure of state capacity is infant mortality, which has been shown before to be 
robustly positively correlated with state failure (King and Zeng, 2001).  Infant mortality is also an 
excellent measure of the quality of public goods provision, inasmuch as it is an unambiguously 
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undesirable phenomenon which all states have the potential to reduce as low as possible, its 
measurement is not particularly controversial relative to other measures of public goods provision, 
and reductions in infant mortality generally come about through an increase in the quality and 
quantity of public goods provision rather than merely through higher levels of income (Abouharb 
and Kimball 2007).  As such in column 7 I control for change in the log of infant mortality rates.6 
I next control for Anderson (1991)'s argument that the creation of modern nations is the 
result of print capitalism, by adding a control for change in newspaper circulation per capita in 
column 8 (with the same results but a much smaller sample size for change in book production per 
capita.)  Finally, in column 9 I control for changes in total fertility rate, crude mortality rate, median 
age and sex ratio to account for the possibility that demographic changes are causing changes in 
ethnic identification across time. 
As seen in Table 1, the results are quite striking: not only is the coefficient for change in 
carbon emissions always statistically significant at the 1% level, despite notably reduced sample 
sizes in columns 3-8, but the coefficient on the migration variable varies widely in magnitude and is 
statistically significant in only half of the regressions, and the coefficients on the other variables are 
not statistically significant.  Indeed, despite very different sample sizes the carbon emissions 
variable coefficient does not vary widely around its mean of -0.03.  Using this average coefficient, 
an increase in one standard deviation of log of carbon emissions in metric tons per capita would 
lead to a 0.02 decline in ELF over the period in question.  While these numbers appear small, a 0.02 
decrease in ELF is equivalent to a population split evenly between two ethnic groups moving to one 
split 60% in favour of the larger group and 40% for the smaller one.  Moreover, there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the change in ELF variable within the dataset: for instance, countries 
like Libya and Oman were able to erase 33% of the difference in ELF between them and Ireland 
over this short 24-year period.  Indeed, it is important to remember that the aforementioned recent 
theories of the origins of ethnic diversity from Ahlerup and Olson (2012) and Michalopoulos (2012) 
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propose mechanisms that work over hundreds, thousands and even tens of thousands of years, so 
any notable amount of change in ELF over a quarter of a century is an impressive feat. 
 To test for robustness I examined a variety of different-sized samples in Appendix 2, 
including sub-samples excluding Africa, excluding all but African countries, and excluding the 
Americas, Asia and Europem as well as former British colonies as well as all countries where the 
ANM only lists one ethnic group and states with populations less than 500,000 in 1960.  In none of 
these regressions does the carbon emissions coefficient drop below the 1% level of significance. 
 
4. Additional Results 
 
A next step is to examine what process is driving the decline in ELF across countries.  The 
most obvious mechanism is that the largest ethnic group in each country is growing in size as 
members of ethnic minorities increasingly identify with it over time, a process which corresponds to 
the Marxian/Gellnerian framework discussed above.  I use the ANM dataset to measure the change 
in the largest ethnic group per country as my new dependent variable, and rerun all of the same 
specifications from Table 1, as presented in Appendix 3.  (I also reran all of the specifications from 
Appendix 2, with identical results which I have not included here for lack of space.)  As seen, the 
results are very consistent: the coefficient on the carbon emissions variable is now positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level in all but one specification. 
A further step is to employ alternative measures of industrialization, which is useful not only 
as a robustness test but also to provide evidence for the operative mechanism, namely the declining 
value of land.  I employ three such alternatives here, namely cement production, urbanization and 
agriculture as a percentage of GDP.  My first alternative measure of industrialization is cement 
production, which contributes around 5% of total carbon emissions globally and 2% of global 
energy consumption (Worrell et al. 2001).  Cement is the main ingredient in concrete, which is the 
most widely used product in the modern world by weight after water, and is thus a good measure of 
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industrialization.  Moreover, unlike other industrial products such as steel and electricity, cement 
production is mostly consumed domestically due to relatively high transport costs and wide 
availability of raw materials, and is thus a relatively good proxy for cement consumption as well.  
Finally, like carbon emissions it exhibits a S-shaped curve as countries at high levels of GDP/capita 
stabilize their production (Mahasenan et al. 2002). 
The second alternative measure is urbanization, or the increase in the percentage of people 
living in urban areas.  Urbanization is classically seen as an outcome of rural-urban migration as a 
product of the creation of an urban industrial sector, as seen in the stylized models by Marx and 
Gellner presented above, as well as the creation of cheap food for urban workers as a result of 
industrialized agriculture.  Historically there exists a large amount of evidence tying together 
urbanization and the rise of a non-agricultural industrial or service-based economy (Gollin et al. 
2016; Michaels et al. 2012).  Moreover, urbanization captures the operative mechanism quite well, 
inasmuch as it measures the structural shift from a population based in rural areas to one more 
centered in urban centers.  Finally, urbanization levels exhibit an S-shaped curve inasmuch 
countries stabilize at high levels, often considerably lower than 100%.  
Third and finally, I use data on agriculture as a percentage of GDP, which captures the 
sectoral change that is part and parcel of industrialization.  As with urbanization, this variable 
captures the essence of the operative mechanism as societies become decreasingly reliant upon rural 
agriculture for their economic output.  Here the data clearly exhibits an inverted S-shaped curve (or 
rather a Z-shaped curve), with many countries stabilizing at a certain level for a long period of time.  
However, as noted above, the data is only available from the World Bank for 47 countries back to 
1961.  As such I have backward projected the data from 1970, which yields an additional 19 
countries, with the caveat that the data quality is questionable. 
As such I reran regression #3 for all three alternative measures of industrialization, with 
results listed in Table 2.  In all three regressions the coefficients have the right sign and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
There is one caveat I should note before concluding.  As with any OLS regression there 
remains concerns about issues of endogeneity whereby some unknown variable could determine 
change in both ethnicity and industrialization.  Yet, as noted above, the causes of ethnic 
fractionalization suggested in the literature are all time-invariant and thus cancel out by the use of a 
long-difference regression.  Ideally it would be useful to demonstrate that the relationship between 
industrialization and ethnic homogenization is not just correlative but also causal by instrumenting 
for carbon emissions or another proxy for industrialization.  Yet doing so would require not only 
finding a variable that is correlated with changes in carbon emissions between 1961 and 1985 but 
also demonstrating that this variable only affected ethnic identity via changes in carbon emissions.  
Given the voluminous and disputed literature on why some countries industrialize and others do 
not, not surprisingly it has proven impossible to find such a variable, and thus I do not attempt to 
claim causality here. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have argued that industrialization creates incentives for ethnic 
homogenization.  Based upon a long tradition of social theory and history reaching back to Marx 
and Gellner, among others, I argued that industrialization lowers ethnic diversity by raising the 
relative value of labor over land.  I then used Soviet data to show that rising levels of carbon 
emissions per capita was robustly correlated with declining levels of ethnic fractionalization across 
time.  Moreover, consistent with Marx and Gellner’s theories, I showed that industrialization is also 
correlated with an increase in the percentage of people identifying with the largest ethnic group per 
country.  Finally, I found that change in ethnic fractionalization is negatively correlated with 
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alternative proxies of industrialization such as change in cement production per capita, urbanization 
and agriculture as a percentage of GDP, which not only served as robustness checks for my analysis 
but also provided evidence for the relative decline in the value of land as the operative mechanism 
in a “bottom-up” manner. 
There are at least three broader conclusions that I can make from this study.  First and most 
obviously, on an empirical level future research on ethnicity that uses panel data or times series 
analyses cannot continue to assume that ethnicity is fixed and unchanging, especially in regression 
models that include measures of industrialization as a covariate.  If my analysis is correct then the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and outcomes such as low economic growth, civil wars and 
poor public goods provision might merely be correlational rather than causational. 
Second, there is little evidence here supporting the role of the state in promoting ethnic 
identity change.  This finding thus fails to support other research which suggests that states have 
played a major role in the formation of contemporary ethnic and national identities (Gellner 2006 
[1983]; Malesevic 2013; Mann 2013; Weber 1976; Wimmer 2015).  There are four potential ways 
to account for these contradictory findings.  First, it is possible that, with the accumulation of better 
data, the collective evidence on modern identity formation is beginning to swing towards the role of 
economic factors and incentives over political ones, both in the contemporary world and more 
historically (Robinson 2014; Nix and Qian 2015).  Second, it is possible that states were effective at 
promoting ethnic homogenization in the pre-modern world but have been less effective in the 
modern world, which would account for Wimmer’s findings on the correlation between state history 
and ethnic fractionalization as well as additional evidence on the inability of modern states to 
follow pre-modern states in imposing ethnic/linguistic homogeneity on their citizens 
(Bandyopadhyay and Green 2013; Laitin 2007; Wimmer 2015).  Third, it is possible that the 
mechanism by which modern states have been able to promote ethnic homogenization is actually 
via industrialization, which is more aligned with aforementioned findings of Gellner and Eugen 
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Weber.  Fourth, it is possible that state-promoted identity change works on a longer time scale than 
the 24-year period under examination here. 
Third and finally, future research may wish to address in more detail the implications of my 
analysis.  For instance, if industrialization contributes towards ethnic change, then the intra-ethnic 
reciprocity norms discussed by Habyarimana et al. (2009) may be weaker in more industrialized 
countries where many co-ethnics have recently assimilated into new identities.  As regards policy 
debates, if industrialization contributes to lower levels of ethnic diversity then governments should 
encourage more industrialization if they want to bypass the negative effects of ethnic diversity on 
economic and political development.  This is a markedly different policy prescription than previous 
attempts to manage the negative effects of ethnic diversity: for instance, Laitin (2007, 112) argues 
that governments should instead create sub-national ethnically distinct or homogenous jurisdictions.  
Moreover, it is one that is at odds with current development discourse, which has moved away from 
industrialization and modernization in favor of poverty reduction and human development (Chang 
2013).  As with other conclusions, however, this proposal remains a topic for further investigation. 
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Table 1: Industrialization and Ethnic Change 
(Dependent Variable: Change in ELF, 1961-1985) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Δ CO2 emissions per capita, -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.030*** 
 1960-1985  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Δ Immigrants as a % of 0.517** 0.568*** 0.336 0.404 0.481** 0.417 0.308** 0.562* 0.465** 
   the Population, 1960-1985 (0.204) (0.195) (0.269) (0.271) (0.242) (0.256) (0.156) (0.011) (0.206) 
ELF, 1961   -0.001 
    (0.017) 
CO2 emissions, 1961  0.005 
    (0.003) 
Immigrants as a % of the  0.142 
 Population, 1960  (0.092) 
Δ Log GDP per capita,   0.013 
 1961-1985    (0.009) 
Δ Polity IV democracy score,    0.007 
 1961-1985     (0.007) 
Δ Mean Years of Schooling,     -0.004 
   1960-1985      (0.005) 
Δ Government Revenue as a %      0.101 
   of GDP, 1961-1985      (0.122) 
Δ Log Infant Mortality,       -0.006 
 1961-1985        (0.010) 
Δ Newspaper Circulation per        -0.002 
 capita, 1961-1985        (0.011) 
Δ Crude Mortality Rate,         0.233 
   1960-1985          (0.142) 
Δ Total Fertility Rate,         0.003 
   1960-1985          (0.005) 
Δ Median Age, 1960-1985         0.003 
           (0.002) 
Δ Sex Ratio, 1960-1985         0.090 
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           (0.156) 
 
Constant  0.026*** 0.018* 0.022*** 0.019** 0.033** 0.025* 0.015 0.025** 0.039*** 
   (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
 
N   133 133 95 96 110 85 88 92 131  
  
R2   0.248 0.322 0.236 0.176 0.252 0.280 0.233 0.252 0.286 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Industrialization and Ethnic Change, with Alternative Proxies for Industrialization 
(Dependent Variable: Change in % ELF, 1961-1985) 
   
 (1) (2) (3)  
 
Δ in Log of Cement Production -0.013***  
 per capita, 1961-1985 (0.005)  
Δ in Urbanization,  -0.176** 
 1960-1985  (0.072) 
Δ in Agriculture as a % of   0.087** 
 GDP, 1961-1985   (0.042) 
Constant 0.011 0.017** -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
  
N  109 151 66  
   
R2  0.209 0.127 0.231 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses.  Change in Migrant 
Stock is included as a control variable in all regressions but is not shown here. 
 
                                               
1 The dataset does not include Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia inasmuch as data on both carbon emissions 
and international migration was only available for their various successor states. 
2 Using World Bank data, the number of country observations for these variables dating back to 1961 are 34 and 47, 
respectively.  The same problem of missing country-year observations afflicts a variety of other data as well. 
3 The Dfbeta tool calculates the difference in the regression coefficient for a particular variable with and without each 
individual observation.  The rule of thumb is to exclude outliers that yield a DFbeta value greater than |1|; in this case 
Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE all had DFbeta values of |1.3| or greater for either change in carbon emissions or change in 
migrant stock, with no other observation above |0.6|.  Cf. Belsley et al. (1980), 28.. 
4 It is immediately clear from Figure 1 that Saudi Arabia is far away from the trend line.  If it is excluded then the 
coefficient on the carbon emissions is considerably larger. 
5 The problem of missing data is particularly egregious in the case of African states, which are often missing data on 
such measures as revenue as a percentage of GDP and infant mortality. 
6 The same results hold when using changes in road density and doctors per capita as additional proxies for state 
capacity. 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   
  Number Mean St. Dev Minimum  Maximum  
ELF, 1961 133 0.438 0.280 0.003 0.909 
Δ ELF, 1961-1985 133 -0.0005 0.063 -0.147 0.269 
Log of Carbon Emissions per 133 -0.634 1.829 -4.761 3.595 
 capita, 1961 
Δ Carbon Emissions, 1961-1985 133 0.824 0.676 -1.106 2.611 
Δ Immigrants (% of the 133 0.002 0.048 -0.190 0.249 
 Population, 1960-85) 
Δ Largest Ethnic Group 1960-85 133 -0.004 0.052 -0.179 0.172  
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Appendix 2: Industrialization and Ethnic Change, Sub-Samples 
   (Dependent Variable: Change in ELF, 1961-1985)  
 
       Excluding Excluding Excluding 
  Excluding Only Excluding Excluding Excluding Ex-British Mono-Ethnic Small 
  SS Africa SS Africa Americas Asia Europe Colonies Countries States 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Δ CO2 emissions per capita, -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.045*** -0.025*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.022*** 
 1960-1985 (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Δ Immigrants as a % of 0.579** 0.028 0.481** 0.832*** 0.353*** 0.697*** 0.581*** 0.365 
   the Population, 1960-1985 (0.228) (0.217) (0.219) (0.210) (0.213) (0.267) (0.223) (0.242) 
 
Constant 0.033** 0.002 0.021 0.033*** 0.016* 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.016 
  (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) 
 
N  95 38 105 104 109 95 114 109 
  
R2  0.280 0.156 0.257 0.394 0.138 0.350 0.295 0.159 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses.  Small states are defined here as states with a population lower than 
500,000 in 1960. 
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Appendix 3: Industrialization and Ethnic Change for the Largest Ethnic Group 
(Dependent Variable: Change in % of the largest ethnic group, 1961-1985) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Δ CO2 emissions per capita, 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.015** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.017* 0.020*** 
 1960-1985  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
Δ Immigrants as a % of -0.295** -0.371*** -0.202 -0.128 -0.218* -0.238 -0.324** -0.201 -0.297** 
   the Population, 1960-1985 (0.119) (0.122) (0.181) (0.112) (0.126) (0.232) (0.124) (0.155) (0.140) 
Largest Ethnic Group %, 1961  0.002  
    (0.019) 
CO2 emissions, 1961  -0.0005 
    (0.003) 
Immigrants as a % of the  -0.119 
 Population, 1960  (0.067) 
Δ Log GDP per capita,   0.0008 
 1961-1985    (0.010) 
Δ Polity IV democracy score,    -0.001 
 1961-1985     (0.007) 
Δ Mean Years of Schooling,     0.008* 
   1960-1985      (0.005) 
Δ Government Revenue as a %      -0.094 
   of GDP, 1961-1985      (0.090) 
Δ Log Infant Mortality,       -0.004 
 1961-1985        (0.010) 
Δ Newspaper Circulation per        0.008 
 capita, 1961-1985        (0.008) 
Δ Crude Mortality Rate,         -0.163 
   1960-1985          (0.109) 
Δ Total Fertility Rate,         -0.004 
   1960-1985          (0.004) 
Δ Median Age, 1960-1985         -0.0004 
           (0.002) 
Δ Sex Ratio, 1960-1985         0.041 
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           (0.137) 
 
Constant  -0.022*** -0.017 -0.021** -0.015** -0.037*** -0.017 -0.017 -0.016* -0.034*** 
   (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
N   133 133 95 96 110 85 88 92 131 
   
R2   0.149 0.194 0.121 0.051 0.157 0.154 0.134 0.089 0.162 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 4: Data Sources 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Δ in ELF: Change in ELF between 1961 and 1985 as measured by the ANM. 
 
Δ in Largest Ethnic Group: Change in the size of the largest ethnic group between 1961 and 1985 as 
measured by the ANM. 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Δ CO2 emissions 1961-1985: Change in log of CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita, 1961-1985. 
Source: : World Bank World Development Indicators, with data originally taken from the 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (run by the 
US Department of Energy). 
 
CO2 emissions, 1961: Log of CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita in 1961. Source: World Bank 
World Development Indicators, with data originally taken from the Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (run by the US Department 
of Energy). 
 
Δ Agriculture as a % of GDP, 1961-1985: Change in agriculture as a percentage of GDP, 1961-
1985. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
   
Δ Cement production per capita, 1961-1985: Change in log of cement production in metric tons per 
capita, 1961-1985.  Source: Cross National Times Series Data Archive.  In some cases the 
1961 data was backward projected from 1962 (Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Samoa, 
Uganda), 1963 (Kenya), 1964 (Malawi, Malta), 1965 (Gambia, Maldives, Singapore, 
Zambia), and 1966 (Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho).  For countries recorded as having no 
cement production in 1961 but some in 1985 I assigned a value of 0.001 tons per capita in 
1961 in order to avoid taking the log of zero. 
 
Δ Crude Mortality Rate, 1960-1985: Change in crude death rates per country, 1960-1985.  Source: 
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects. 
 
ELF, 1961: ELF per country as measured in 1961.  Source: ANM. 
 
Δ GDP/capita Change 1961-1985: Change in levels of GDP/capita per country, 1961-1985.  
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2009. "Penn World Table, 
Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Δ Immigrants (% of the Population, 1960-1985): Change in the ratio of total migrants to the total 
population per country, 1960-1985.  Source: United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects. 
 
Immigrants as a % of the Population, 1960: Ratio of total migrants to the total population per 
country in 1960.  Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects. 
 
Δ Log Infant Mortality, 1960-1985: Change in the log of infant mortality rates, 1960-1985.  Source: 
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects. 
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Δ Mean Years of Schooling 1960-1985: Change in the mean years of primary and secondary 
schooling per country, 1960-1985. Source: Barro, R., & Lee, J.-W. (2010). A New Data Set 
on Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010. NBER Working Paper #15902, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
   
Δ Median Age, 1960-1985: Change in median age per country, 1960-1985.  Source: United Nations 
Population Division, World Population Prospects. 
 
Δ Newspaper Circulation per capita, 1961-1985: Change in daily newspaper circulation per capita 
per country, 1961-1985.  Source: Cross National Times Series Data Archive. 
 
Δ Polity IV, 1961-1985: Change in a country’s democracy rating, 1961-1985.  Source: Polity IV. 
 
Δ Sex Ratio, 1960-1985: Change in sex ratio (total number of women divided by total number of 
men) per country, 1960-1985.  Source: United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects. 
 
Δ Government Revenue as a % of GDP, 1960-1985: Change in government revenue as a percentage 
of GDP per country, 1960-1985.  Source: Cross National Times Series Data Archive. 
 
Δ Total Fertility Rate, 1960-1985: Change in total fertility rates per country, 1960-1985.  Source: 
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects. 
 
Δ Urbanization, 1960-1985: Change in the percentage of a country’s population living in urban 
areas, 1960-1985.  Source: United Nations, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2012 
Revision,” Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division (2013). 
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Appendix 5: Assessing the Accuracy of the Soviet ELF Data 
 
The Soviet data on ELF is given in two volumes.  The first volume is an atlas, with ethnographic 
maps in the beginning followed by data on the ethnic composition at the end.  The second volume 
does not have any maps and does not list ethnic groups per country in tabular form for the same 
number of countries that were listed in the first volume, but instead has textual descriptions for 72 
out of 187 countries.  With the help of Russian-speaking research assistants I coded ethnic data for 
all countries in the dataset across the two years in question. 
  
As a means of checking the accuracy of the Soviet data I compared its ELF scores to ELF scores 
generated from the first eight years of data from demographic and health surveys (DHS) conducted 
across a number of developing countries between 1986 and 1993.  The DHS surveys provide a good 
independent data source, both because they were conducted just after the Soviet data was published 
(and were thus not a source for the Soviet data) and because they provide primary evidence of 
ethnic identity in a non-census format, thereby bypassing at least some of the problems associated 
with census data noted above. 
 
In most cases data on ethnic identity was not collected, but in the sixteen countries listed below in 
Table A2.1 we can compile an ELF score based on the DHS survey data collected between 1986 
and 1993 (which varied in number from 3199 people in Mali to 7150 in Kenya).  The DHS 
researchers mostly collected data on the same lines as the Soviet data, with three exceptions.  In 
Guatemala the DHS data only listed two ethnic groups, namely indigenous (Indian) and Ladino, 
while the Soviet data was more detailed, which led me to collapse the Soviet data into two 
comparable groups.  In the Philippines the Soviet data listed the Bisaya or Visayan group, while the 
DHS listed the three major sub-groups of the Bisaya (Cebuano, Ilonggo and Waray), which led me 
to collapse the DHS data.  Finally, in Ghana data was tabulated at the level of the sub-ethnic group 
for the Akan peoples in the Soviet data but was only tabulated at the level of the ethnic group in the 
DHS data, therefore leading me to count the Akan as one ethnic group in both cases.  In four cases, 
namely Ghana, Guatemala, Kenya and Senegal, DHS data on ethnic identity was collected for both 
rounds; as such I take the mean values across the two rounds. 
 
As can be seen in Figure A1, the correlation between the Soviet and DHS data is very high: when 
regressing the Soviet data on the DHS data the DHS variable has a coefficient of 0.946 and the R2 
is 0.978.  Sri Lanka is the only outlier in the relationship, which is exactly as we would expect since 
the DHS did not survey Northern and Eastern Provinces due to the ongoing civil war at the time, 
which meant that it oversampled Sinhalese and undersampled Tamils compared to the Soviet data. 
 
Figure A5.1: Comparing Soviet and DHS I ELF data 
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We can observe the same close correlation by just examining the largest ethnic group in each 
country as well in Table A3.2, where we again observe a very high correlation (regression 
coefficient of 0.946 and an R2 of 0.958). 
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Figure A5.2: Largest Ethnic Group, Soviet and DHS I data 
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Table A5.1: Countries Included in DHS/ANM Comparison 
 
Country Year(s) collected 
Burkina Faso 1992 
Ghana 1988, 1993 
Guatemala 1987, 1993 
Kenya 1989, 1993 
Liberia 1986 
Mali 1987 
Namibia 1992 
Niger 1992 
Philippines 1993 
Rwanda 1992 
Senegal 1986, 1992 
Sri Lanka 1987 
Togo 1988 
Turkey 1993 
Uganda 1995 
Zambia 1988 
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Appendix 6: Data Alterations 
 
The following countries were left out of the analysis for the following reasons: 
• Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.  Listed together as 
one unit in the 1961 but separately in the 1985 Atlas. 
• Bangladesh and Pakistan.  Listed together under Pakistan in the 1961 Atlas but separately 
in the 1985 Atlas due to the partition of Pakistan in 1971. 
• Cape Verde. The 1961 Atlas lists groups according to language (where all Portuguese-
speakers are listed as one group) while the 1985 Atlas lists group according to nationality 
(with native Cape Verdeans and Portuguese listed separately). 
• Central African Republic.  The 1985 Atlas lists several indigenous ethnic groups not 
included in the 1961 Atlas, including the Ngbandi (10.6% of the population), Sara (6.9%) 
and Mbum (4.0%), among others. 
• Gabon. The 1985 Atlas lists several indigenous ethnic groups not included in the 1961 
Atlas, including the Mbete (14.2% of the population) and the Ngundi (5.3%). 
• Kiribati and Tuvalu. Listed together under the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the 1961 Atlas 
but separately in the 1985 Atlas due to their separate independence in 1976. 
• Papua New Guinea.  Listed separately as New Guinea and Papua in the first volume as the 
two constituent units of what was then the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. 
• Réunion.  The 1961 Atlas lists groups according to language (where all French-speakers are 
listed as one group) while the 1985 Atlas lists group according to race (with Creoles and 
French listed separately). 
• Surinam.  The 1961 Atlas lists groups according to language (where all Dutch-speakers are 
listed as one group) while the 1985 Atlas lists group according to race (with Creoles, “Bush 
Negros” and Dutch listed separately). 
 
In the following cases I coded ELF differently from Roeder (2001): 
• Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia.  I coded Arabs as 
one ethnic group rather than coding them by nationality. 
• Brunei. I coded the Malays and Kedayan as one group in 1985 inasmuch as they were 
coded as one group in 1961 (and in every census in Brunei since 1960). 
• Liberia. I coded the Grebo, Kran and Kru as one group in 1985 inasmuch as they were 
recorded as one group in 1961. 
• Mali. I coded the Bambara, Duala and Mandinka as one group in 1985 inasmuch as they 
were recorded as one group in 1961. 
• Netherlands.  I coded the Flemish as Dutch in 1985 to match the fact that both were 
recorded as one group in 1961. 
• Switzerland.  I coded the French speakers, German speakers and Italian speakers as single 
ethnic groups in 1985 to match the fact that they were recorded as such in 1961. 
• Vietnam.  I added data for 1961 to the dataset inasmuch as it was listed as a single unit in 
1961 despite the fact that it was partitioned between 1954 and 1975. 
 
Finally, I added the following countries which were listed in both Atlases but were not included in 
(Roeder, 2001)’s original dataset: Belize, Bermuda, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, Macao, 
Solomon Islands, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Timor-Leste, Tonga and the US Virgin 
Islands. 
 
 
 
 
